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Chiastic Logic in W atsuji's Climatology 
Kah kyung Cho 
Together with Kitaro Nishida who is the unquestioned standard bearer of modern 
Japan's philosophy, Tetsuro Watsuji contributed significantly to making the way of 
Japanese thinking known to the outside world. Watsuji's Fuda (Wind and Earth) is 
his representative work in which he explores the unique sensitivity of Japanese 
people as they interact with their physico-cultural milieu. 
Nishida abstracted from the phenomenal world as far as to uncover beneath it 
the topos (basho) of Nothingness. At this stage, mind is no longer separated from 
object. There is neither the interiority of the subject affected by the exterior influence, 
nor the objectivity constituted by the inner forms of intuition. Watsuji took apparently 
the opposite course in his search for concrete existence of man. To exist meant for 
him to stand into the specific geo-physically determinate space (kukan). But because 
such space is always already thoroughly permeated by the language of felt awareness 
of man's being-there (Dasein), the mediation is complete between subject and object. 
Thus Nishida's conceptual abstraction and W atsuji's aesthetic intuition share in the 
final analysis the same premise: the primacy of the spaciality over temporality. 
Hitherto, W atsuji has been better known for his work in the area of ethics and 
for his observations in art and art history. My main curiosity, however, was directed 
toward the logical aspect of his thought on space. This was stimulated in no small 
measure by the study which Augustin Berque has carried out amplifying Watsuji's 
climatological ruminations. What I met in Berque was stil a Western logic that 
dominated through the ages from Aristotle to Descartes, but it was one embellishied 
and enriched by what Berque so graciously attributes to Watsuji's seminal mind. 
A shorter version of this paper was originally presented in October 2001 at Kansai 
University. The occasion was the celebration of the 50th anniversary of its East-
ー
West Cultural Institute, where I had the pleasure of meeting Professor Berque in 
person. I am very much indebted ro Professor Katsuhito Inowue not only for 
arranging this meeting, but also for his permission to print the fuller version of this 
paper in the journal Metaphysica of Osaka University. It is to be acknowleged here 
that at the invitation of Professor Gunshi Satomi I read a similar, though a somewhat 
more ethically focused paper on W atsuji in his seminar. 
As a modem inquiry into the physico-cultural milieu of human being, climatology 
is a relatively young science. From its recent past, Alfred Biese (1856-1930) deserves 
to be remembered for his groundbreaking historical studies on the interactive relation 
between aesthetic feelings and physical environmenビButit is Watsuji Tetsuro 
(1889-1960) who looms larger in the background of climatological deliberations as 
we shift the focus from the historical to the philosophical. For it is he who initiated 
this particular form of space-oriented phenomenological inquiry, opening a significant 
"Eastern" perspective at the same time, and thus set the tone for a novel and 
"down to earth" self-understanding of man and his culture. 
Watsuji's idea of a physico-cultural milieu was conceived in a gesture of challenging 
the monopoly of the temporality as the total horizon of inquiry into the ontological 
structure of man. To him, temporality by and in itself seemed to be too abstract 
and narrow. He was convinced that only the climatologically profiled "living space" 
could genetically and thus more effectively explain the historical nature of human 
existence. However, inspired as he was by vivid imagination in combining a wealth 
of perceptual data with meaning-endowing concepts, his research was hampered 
by the lack of a consistent methodology and disciplined reasoning. This is not to 
say that Watsuji depended exclusively on intuition and imagination. His sound instinct 
was to gain access to the "primordial" layer of the literally weather-sheathed 
"being-in-the-world" of man, shunning the conventional schematic division of 
subject-object. He made it clear that he was following the phenomenological and 
hermeneutic modes of description. But how consistently was he able to apply these 
methods? 
The point of departure of such description is the decentralized subject which is 
no longer the detached consciousness as such, nor the sovereign reason lording 
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over the realm of nature as its scientifically controllable object domain. Rather, it is 
a "bodily" subject whose comportment to the world that envelops it has to be 
understood primarily in terms of reacting to and interacting with the elementary 
self-manifestation of nature. It is only appropriate to describe this state of man's 
being in the world as passively acted upon, as subliminally "attuned" (gestimmt). 
At this stage, man is not the self-transparent Cogito sum in active control of itself, 
Man's emotion, temperament and wil are al permeated by the primary perceptions 
through which the world "announces itself and in which man is involuntarily 
affected and awakened to "find himself (sich befinden). Even the higher order 
constructs of the mind, such as language, art, culture and history, are eventually the 
outgrowth of this form of substantial life-and-world encounter. The primitive texture 
of life-worldly experience constitutes, progressively refined, the warp and woof of 
the higher-level conceptual tapestries called culture and science. 
Watsuji was a thinker driven by his natural penchant toward the hidden origin 
and source of intentional meaning. The then dominant Hegelian type of conclusive 
rational system that seemingly found al the knowable truths and answers was suspect 
to him. He felt a strong sense of affinity with the unstable, ever forward pressing 
and questioning attitude of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, and studied them years before 
they became popular figures of the twentieth century. The "origin" Watsuji searched 
has the dual aspect of being the first in time as well as being the closest in lived 
experience. Separately, the former becomes the task of hermeneutic interpretation 
of historical documents, the latter phenomenological problem of intuiting essences 
among experiential facts. But in Watsuji the historically interpreted and the intuitively 
exhibited meanings were often inseparable, as in the description of classical art 
works of Greek or Buddhist origin. It is only regrettable that the instruments of 
both phenomenology and hermeneutics available during his time were either as yet 
insufficiently fine-tuned for his task or they were underemployed by himself. 
Thus a rather diffused conceptualization without firm methodical principles res叫 ed
in his being liable to the same kind of criticism to which the poetically imaginative 
mind of Herder was once subjected. Herder introduced, it may be recalled, in a 
conscious effort to counter the confining aprioristic, rational concepts of Kant's 
philosophical anthropology, the spatio-climatological dimension into the natural history 
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of mankind. He emphasized the role of human sensibility which is intimately tied 
with specific climatic conditions. But precisely this impressionistic approach had 
provided the occasion for Kant to criticize Herder's "hurry-scurry and widely 
roaming glance," and his "ever ready sagacity in spotting analogies" instead of "logical 
punctuality in determining the concepts, or the careful distinction and confirmation 
of prmc1ples. 
,z 
More to the point, there is a tendency in Watsuji to overplay the causal implications 
of climatological space. He does not hesitate to deduce from climatological determinants 
the existing ethnic diversity and plurality of moral orientation among nations. For 
instance, he says that it was Nature's design for a certain nation to have a climatic 
environment which "stimulates moral endeavor," while Nature gave another nation 
an environment "favorable for harmonizing duty and inclination." In the context in 
which Watsuji was making these contrasting remarks, (Fudo, 376 f.)3 the former is 
referring obviously to the nation that produced the rigoristic moral philosophy of 
Kant, and the latter may well be represented by Watsuji's own country whose climate 
may have attuned its people to seek reconciliation of moral differences. In either 
case, Watsuji operates on the assumption that nature is no longer just an object, 
but has metaphorically reversed its role into that of a subject. 
This is a phenomenologically important insight into the relational structure of 
man who is not only cast into a place "in between" among fellow humans, but also 
situated "in the middle" of the world, i.e. surrounded by it, instead of facing or 
confronting it. Seen from the reverse angle, the world of nature is no longer the 
sum of al objects devoid of meaning in themselves, an "empty schema X." Rather 
than being ineluctably correlated to whatever intentional acts human consciousness 
chooses to perform and thus fil such emptiness, nature emerges as milieu, a living 
environment which organically interacts with human being. In this sense, living 
space and the Euclidian space are the extreme antipodes. As milieu, nature already 
is blended with culture. The most rudimentary form of such commerce begins at 
the level of mood (Stimmung) generated through climatic influence. But does this 
influence go really as far as Watsuji thinks it does? What is problematic is that, 
given his knowledge of Kant's aprioristic moral philosophy, Watsuji seems to 
underestimate the difficulty to reconcile the rational will with nature, especially 
4
 
that part of nature which operates as inclination in human being. How could such a 
wil that radically transcends nature in Kant's sense stil be explained in terms of 
natural, i.e. climatological influence? 
Surely Watsuji does not simply locate this transcendent wil within the brute nature 
itself. He recognizes that nature understood as the origin of wil is a culturally 
mediated concept. But even under that premise, the wil totally shaped by nature 
and the wil transcending nature are, with regard to the degree to which each of 
them is culturally mediated, quite asymmetrical. Much less can they be placed on 
the same scale as manifestations of nature's own "diversity." For the wil to transcend 
nature pure and simple is the negation of this diversity. Watsuji's logical short-
circuit can be prevented only if he takes the reversibility of "nature as object" into 
"nature as subject" as what it really is, namely, an analogy. As an analogy, nature 
elevated to the "subject" of climatology can by no means enjoy the same conceptual 
accountability and transparency as Logos, Reason or rational wil, al of which have 
been accepted for their well fleshed out historical role as the subject in metaphysics, 
epistemology, ethics and religion. 
These concepts are posited as absolute, universally valid and unconditionally 
binding principles for al members of the real and possible community of rational 
beings. On the other hand, no such discursively reached unanimity in the power of 
something as great as Reason could be expected from a tradition in which man is 
defined as a part of nature. Here in Asia, what Max Weber called "demystification 
(Entzauberung) of the world" apparently did not keep pace with the wholesale reception 
of Western science. Speaking specifically of the Japanese culture, no matter how 
painstakingly the phenomena of nature may seem to have been subjected to esthetic 
differentiations, often with the aid of distinctly Wes tern conceptual tols, Japanese 
poetry and letters continue to place a premium on the residual value of something 
ineffable or unsaid. In the area of morality, a similarly underdefined, vacuous buffer 
zone seems to exist in the name of human nature. It has the function of diverting 
or diffusing the harsh impact of the imperatives of rationalistic ethics. It is only 
with such a background in mind that one could speak, as Watsuji did, undoubtedly 
with some sense of elation, of "harmony between duty and inclination."4 Thus what 
may be a conceptual impossibility in one culture, becomes a welcome pragmatic 
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virtue in another, even if it means bending the principle for the sake of "inter-
human" accommodation or convenience. 
The spatio-climatological determinism, toward which apparently Watsuji's position 
gravitates, can at most explain man's wil to conform to nature. But it cannot explain 
the paradox of rational wil turning against nature. This fact must inevitably have 
some consequences for the understanding of history. From Watsuji's climatological 
standpoint, only the kind of time proper to nature, namely, the circular and recurrent 
temporal pattern in history may be legitimized. Any universally progressive, 
eschatological sense of history to which nature is subordinated as a mere stage or 
"material cause", i.e. something to be creatively transformed by a nature-transcending 
wil, remains a fortiori precluded. Yet the paradox is al the more striking when 
one notices that in modern Japan, and somewhat less conspicuously also in China 
and Korea, the ethos of progress predicated on technical exploitation of nature 
coexists with the traditional estheticism rooted deeply in religious feeling for nature. 
In order to displace the immanent teleology of nature, as happened for the most 
part in the Christianized West, a highly saturated historical consciousness, determined 
by the wil to confer meaning to the seeming disarray of events in human history, 
had to come into being. Such meaning in history, often in the name of "revealed" divine 
wil, is, after al, something constructed according to man's own purposive time plan 
and must be distinguished from nature's spontaneous "design." 
W atsuji, of course, is critical of any attempt at privileging history which is 
disconnected from nature. For this reason, he would readily agree with those critics 
who suspect that Kant was using the "teleology of nature" as a mask for "the 
Providence or the Creator." (Fudo, 376) If God should be behind the teleology of 
nature, asks Watsuji, then why did God need to create such diverse geographical 
regions, such a variety of climates and so many distinctly different people on 
earth? Wouldn't the creation of one or a few most optimal physical environments, 
and perhaps the selection of a most favorable type of human race, have better 
served the plan of God? But here again, Watsuji exposes himself to the charge that 
he is placing human being on the same level as landscape and climate. If it was 
God's creative genius to produce such diversity of geography and climate to which 
as many different ethnic characteristics correspond, then why shouldn't it be in his 
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power also to create a religion whose message can ring true universally in spite of 
al ethnic diversities and climatological differences? Ih other words, God would 
have preferred man to be free to choose the good, rather than conditioned by nature 
to be good. The origin of the Hebrew religion, for instance, may be initialy correlated 
to certain characteristic features of "desert climate," but the subsequent spread of 
Christianity across the widest possible geographical regions may hardly be explainable 
in terms of climatological dynamics alone. 
Thus it was not until Augustin Berque brought his mastery of qualification and 
analytical subtleties to bear upon climatological data that one could see what a 
methodically refined reasoning can do to render climatology absorbingly relevant, 
and at the same time to "resurrect" Watsuji's spirit before more discerning modern 
readers. The centerpiece of the methodological coup by which Berque gave a new, 
respectable meaning to the parole of Fudo has several names, though none stands 
out as strikingly as the notion of trajet. It is defined as "corresponding to (both) 
subject and object"5 in such a way that those two theoretical poles have to be 
"surpassed", i.e. their dualism dissolved into the "chiastic" process or "itineration". 
This means that subject and object have to be brought into a state of "incessant 
exchange." It is reminiscent of the description Hegel made on the dialectical 
movement of Spirit in his Preface to Phenomenology of狐 nd.But here the question 
of similarity is gratuitous, as the clearly intended contextual reference is to none 
other than the concept of chiasm, a term which Merleau-Ponty brought to such a 
wide currency, that it bears his own stamp throughout. As "pure exchange" between 
subject and object, it is to be differentiated from the dialectical "synthesis," into 
which Hegel6 elevated and transformed the thetic and antithetic relationship between 
those two terms. 
The words "Before" and "After" that appear juxtaposed in the title of our 
deliberations are meant to indicate this shift in methodology. As such, it does not 
simply chronicle the two periods in the popular reception of climatology in Japan: 
the first dating back to the time when Watsuji wrote his Fudo (1935), and the 
second commencing with a new surge of interest in climatology signaled by the 
work of Berque (ca. 1980). Indeed there is a considerable temporal as well as topical 
hiatus between the two periods. Therefore, our focus is not so much on the different 
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standpoints of those two individual thinkers as on the process of the internal logic, 
especially with regard to the logical status of the subject in climatological thinking. 
From this point of view, the difference between the earlier and the later stages is 
not qualitative, but rather gradual, as a certain sense of continuity exists between 
them in terms of articulation and radicalization of the idea of subject. For with al 
the groping tentativeness that characterizes Watsuji's initial experiment. it is his 
major contribution to have caught a glimpse of the essentially correlational character 
between the climatic reality and the mores or the spiritual habitude of people. 
Such a correlation belongs to a class of thinking which is entirely different from 
a mere causal pattern of thought. Let us assume the monsoon climate as A, and a 
volatile temperament of people as B. If we state that B was caused by A, then it is 
a simple climatological determinism, whereby the human subject remains as the 
merely static or receptive subject pole, to whom only "passivity" or at best 
"perseverance" in the face of dominant climatic conditions can be attributed. (Fudo, 
31 f, 205 f, 223) But if we say that "just as the change of seasons is sudden, so are 
also the temperaments of people shifting suddenly", a direct identification of A and 
B is avoided, and A as a "physical", climatic phenomenon is elevated to the position 
of a subject in a "metaphorical" sense. Here we have no longer a "deductive 
construction" from a single fixed substance, but an "inductive comparison" between 
two poles of activities, In the latter case, the "metaphorical relation between the climate 
and the temperament of people" is neither an arbitrary concurrence nor some kind 
of pre-arranged (metaphysical) parallelism, but "it is generated by various interactions 
that the culture has established between the two regions," (FnN, 62 f.) i.e. climate 
and temperament. For those two poles or regions are connected by way of a 
"reversal" (ten-z). And this reversal is made possible by the pervasive operation of 
language. This is where the hermeneutic element comes into play. 
When, for example, Biese pointed out that the "inborn German feeling for nature" 
was "conditioned by climate and landscape," he was not describing a causal connection 
between two phenomena, but was in fact confirming the well known hermeneutical 
thesis that "being that can be understood is language."7 He could not have said "inborn 
feeling," if it were the simple result of external causation by climate or landscape. 
For insofar as feeling is a form of "understanding" in a hermeneutical sense, Biese 
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knew that the felt awareness of the climate and landscape finds its appropriate 
expression in a poetic language. It is predominantly the langnage of "fairy tales," 
the germ of which is "a bit of purest poetry of nature -a genuine nature myth 
transferred to human afairs." Biese added that "the German medieval poetry, as a 
whole, epic and lyric, was interwoven with a hazy network of suggestive myth and 
legend匹 Butthis proximity of the feeling-laden climatological language to myth 
does not mean an obfuscation of what otherwise could be more effectively dealt 
with in a rationally controlled thought process. The word "poetry" in Biese's 
phrase, "purest poetry of nature," must be taken in its primordial sense of "poiesis." 
For at this interface, where man's immersion in nature's environment is immediate 
and complete, he is not at liberty to use the language with which he would construct 
reality in the manner of geometrical space by standing outside of it. Rather, as 
someone surrounded by an unfamiliar milieu, he must find the first word to poetically 
name it just as he lives in it. And it is the climate and landscape mediated by this 
language which Biese meant when he said, rather carelessly, that "the inborn German 
feeling for nature was conditioned by" climate and landscape. 
In Fudo, Watsuji begins his own methodological considerations with concrete 
"states of mind" drawn from everyday lived experience of climate. The language of 
such lived experience of four seasons (kigo. kisetsugo) is found not only in poetry 
and literature, but also in ordinary and・common sense expressions, in greetings and 
friendly concerns about the others'well-being. Thus "feeling cold" is a phenomenon 
in which the structure of our immediate intentional experience is manifest. By 
intentional experience Watsuji means, quoting Heidegger's word "ex-sistere," that 
one stands already outside of oneself -in this case -in the cold. (Fudo, 4 f.)My body 
actively touching the cold air and my passively being touched by it are one 
inseparable phenomenon, like the two sides of a coin. To say that we stand first by 
ourselves, opposite to the outside cold air, and then come into contact with the latter 
to experience the feeling of coldness, is an abstract construction. But more importantly, 
notice how "being outside" and "being in" something other than myself turns out to 
be -far from losing myself -a fundamental way of finding my very own state of 
being in the world. Conversely, climate is not something out there, occupying its 
own space independently of man. The milieu is what is constituted through the 
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interaction of man and climate, rather than being a preexisting empty space into 
which man and climate enter. Watsuji is quite clear about this chiastic exchange of 
the self with the other, and vice versa, when he says that "climatological phenomena 
are the ways in which humans understand themselves." (Fudo, 13) The same 
intentional relation holds true if we magnify the situation in which man and cold 
air are intertwined and replace them by culture and nature. 
It is this larger context in which Watsuji conceived his theory underlying F. 臥do
as a kind of "Archimedian" fulcrum with which the dynamics of human and cultural 
sciences are to be set in motion. As far as the search for the ground zero point of 
orientation goes, there was a similar attempt by Husserl, whose kinesthetic theory 
of "I move myself was his answer to the question as to what constitutes the first 
step that "opens up" the world and its history. The major difference, however, is 
that Husserl thought of man's contact with the world stil in terms of active self-control 
of the bodily subjectivity,9 whereas Watsuji came much closer to employing the 
chiastic model of subject-object exchange within a specific milieu, as shown above 
in his description of the cold outdoor experience. 
When Berque, speaking of this chiastic reversibility, remarks that "nature can be 
understood only through culture," (FnN, 155) this is especially true in the case of 
Japan, in the light of her people's high degree of sensibility for climate and landscape, 
nurtured by her rich tradition in arts and letters, religion and custom. But Berque's 
most philosophically penetrating observation on climatological chiasm is found in a 
comment he makes almost casually after describing the many subtle ways of 
nature's presence in modern cities: "Thus in Tokyo, like in other Japanese cities -
although smaller in scale than in previous Edo -trees serve as an index of the 
immanence of deities in the residential quarters. The cleft in a superbly arranged 
cultural order -i.e. the city -is one left open toward nature. And as for nature, her 
opening is directed toward the highest of al cultural values, namely, the holy and 
sacred." (ibid. 325, free translation into English, italics mine) 
If the holy and sacred is the extreme end at which nature, mediated by culture, 
comes to rest momentarily in her incessant itineration, it would seem an altogether 
futile exercise to determine which of these two members is stil the true, albeit 
hidden, subject. ls it nature? Or is it culture? Who bears the greater burden in 
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maintaining the chiastic balance, especially when one keeps in mind the final goal, 
and the meaning, of its itinerary? Asking who the subject is, may be an old 
Western style question which the logic of chiasm would fain render obsolete. But 
when, in our modern world, both culture and nature seem to have moved so far 
away from what is sacred, and the absence of deities is a glaring reality in so many 
cityscapes, shouldn't it matter to ponder on the secret -on the final cause, so to 
speak -of the ancient chiastic movement of thought? Doesn't modern city planning, 
with its high-profile quota system for restoring the lost ecological balance, only 
compound the woe of covering up natureゆhysis)with more of the un-natural, man-
made art (techn司?If ours is such a hopelessly subjectivistic age, wouldn't the reversal 
of this lopsided relation between nature as object and culture as subject hold the 
key to a possible redemption of the sacral value in this finite, secular setting of life 
on earth? And doesn't such a reversal mean, above al, that man's self-ordained 
centrality within the world constructed solely by him must now give way to the 
wisdom that what is held to be higher and'founding" is actually''founded'by what 
is below? The old name for that which lies underneath and serves as the foundation 
was -subjectum. It is an irony of a distinctively chiastic sort, that in reverse proportion 
to the ascent of man's subjectivity, nature treated as a mere object had sunk so low 
to the bottom that it should now begin to reveal itself as true subjectum. Only in 
this manner may we possibly make sense of the ecological crisis that arose in our 
modern time and has begun to stir dormant feelings for the sacredness of the earth 
agam. 
But in Watsuji's Fudo, Berque immediately recognized nature as this underlying, 
i.e. founding, principle. He cals it "the enduring revelatory significance" of Watsuji's 
work to have shown that the Japanese culture -itself the prima fade subject -"let 
nature, namely, Japan's own environment, emerge as (the true) subject within the 
culture itself as the (quasi) subject," (FnN, 67, words in parentheses mine) Berque's 
praise of Fudo in this Hegelesque description, however, does not come cheaply, as 
his repeated charges of its "determinism" indicate. He is especially critical of the 
fact that even while Watsuji and others have, for the most part, avoided the 
conventional "logic of subject" (shutai-no ronrz) with good instinct, they could not 
"define the other logic that replaces the logic of subject." (ibid. 356 f.) There is a polite 
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ambiguity in Berque's hint that this failure may be "perhaps due to the fact that 
they (Watsuji and others) were not sufficiently clear about the limits of the logic of 
subject." On the other hand, Berque knew also that traditional Western logic falters10 
as soon as it confronts the peculiar, "ilogical" twists and turns of the way Japanese 
think. 
We say "polite" because Berque seems to be singling out neither the Western 
nor the Japanese tradition of "logic" as lacking in itself. In fact, he does not stop in 
front of the "iloglcal" even with regard to the typical Japanese architecture since 
the Middle Age, where an obvious asymmety or inconsistency dominates. Berque 
would go a great length to justify it, and ferret out an intricate internal logic unique 
to the situation. He argues, using some architectural and horticultural specimen, 
that the absence of symmetry and blockage of the overview of the scenery from a 
single standpoint -so contrary to the spirit of Cartesian rationalism -are intended 
precisely and carried out by design. (ibid. 1 97 f.) Eventually this has to do with 
the Japanese mentality of separating and shielding the inner from the outer space, 
and guarding the concept of place (basho) with a greater jealousy than an Aristotelian 
logician would protect the category of substance. 
Next we must also note an "ambiguity" in Berque's politeness toward the 
Japanese sensitivity. For, in the final analysis, it is not likely that Berque would 
compromise the universality claim of the traditional Occidental Logos and the stan-
dard of discourse set by Cartesian rationality. When he reserves for himself, at the 
end of his otherwise extremely thoughtful and balanced work, the right to 
scathingly criticize the pretension on the part of Japanese scholars to claim a high-
er authority for "place", "危do","kami', "tenno" etc. than for Logos, (FnN, 361 f.) we 
must admit that it is certainly his hard earned right to do so. Compared with Karel 
van Wolferen's famous study on Japan11 which was polemical in tenor throughout, 
Berque's approach has the distinction of having penetrated deeper into the 
Japanese psyche and held to it a mirror with a finer self-adjusting dioptrics than 
the Japanese themselves were able to do. 
But the real issue is not about the tone of the critique, whether it be polite or 
polemical. It is about logic, and about where Berque stands with his heart when he 
is apparently pleading on behalf of the logic of chiasm. Since he spoke so openly for 
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the need of the Japanese to find a different kind of logic to replace the ineffectual 
logic of the subject. one would expect him to lead his way through the labyrinth of 
a non-Aristotelian logic so the world could understand the Japanese mind better. 
That, in fact. is what he has done admirably, much to the satisfaction of many a 
self-conscious Japanese reader. This satisfaction is derived from the knowledge that 
by and large the chiastic logic helped to articulate and confirm what Nishida, Watsuji 
and other representative scholars have carved out as essentially indigenous 
Japanese thought, and one that is presentable to the world's main stage of philosophy. 
What we need to be quite clear about, however, is the status of the chiastic logic 
beyond and above its obviously indispensable role within the problematics of Fudo 
and related topics in the Japanese tradition. The truth of the matter is, though, that 
the chiastic logic has its salient place not only in Japanese esthetics. It thrives right 
next to Aristotle, within the Western tradition of metaphysics, much more so than 
perhaps Berque is aware of it . 
Even before Berque gave currency to his cue word "trajectivity," scholars 
(Piaget, Durand, Deleuze, Guattari et. al.) from wide-ranging fields -anthropology, 
sociology, ecology, psychology and esthetics -have been drawn to this conceptual 
apparatus in order to capture the essence of living and lived experience amid the 
fluid phenomenon of life. But assuming that no one else joined the chorus for this 
new formula of the philosophy of life, Merleau-Ponty stil would have given enough 
verve to this chiastic cadence to establish a school of his own. His Phenomenology 
of Perception has already attained something of a classical status in this regard. 
Indisputably, then, the logic of chiasm has become a part of the living stream of 
thought in modern Western philosophy. Not only that, Merleau-Ponty went a step 
further in denouncing the "presumption of absolute consciousness" and declared 
that "the disclosure of this world, of the Being, remains a dead letter as long as we 
do not uproot objective philosophy."12 The apposition of "this world" and "Being" 
indicates a significant link between Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of the living body 
(flesh), in which is anchored ultimately his chiastic logic, and the broader 
phenomenological problem of Husserl's "Life World" as well as Heidegger's 
ontological quest of Being. But before we pursue this point further, let us cast a 
brief glance at the problem that specifically concerns Asian philosophers. 
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Knowing that such a revolt against the traditional Western logic is coming from 
contemporary Western philosophy itself, we, philosophers in Asia, are bound to fel 
the increased pressure on us to react to this significant development. More than 
anybody else, however, it is Japanese scholars who happen to be in the front row 
to show a response one way or the other. It is because man like Augustin Berque 
stood proxy for the Japanese with a voice of conscience which they can il afford to 
ignore. Here, "conscience" is meant as a distinctively French word with its inseparable 
cognitive and moral implications. One might wish to stress the moral dimension 
even more, extending it toward reflectively "sharing" an intimate knowledge, such 
as when one remains a "quiet witness" (der stile Mitwisser) to one's authentic self 
(Kierkegaard). In addition to being clearly audible to both sides of the conventional 
East-West cultural divide, Berque's voice valorizes the esthetic-ethical paradigms of 
traditional Japanese culture with such a love that the question of its origin, 
whether it comes from one's own or alien heart, becomes nearly irrelevant. 
But the cold fact of the matter is that there are, on the one hand, those who are 
stil fully devoted to their age-honored way of thinking and therefore need litle 
encouragement to rejecting the universal validity claim of Logos. To them, as Berque 
has pointed out, (KnN, 245) there is only the "inner" and the "outer" viewpoint. and 
nothing in between. And the inner position has always the ultimate say. They are 
glad that Watsuji's logic of蹄 doand his ethics provide a much needed, if not perfect. 
alternative to the overbearing Western faith in Reason. For better or for worse, 
Berque's critique would have litle impact on their complacent frame of mind. 
On the other hand, the attitude of many other Japanese who specialize in Western 
philosophy is much les self-centered. They may have felt hitherto that the traditional 
Eastern thought belonged merely to a secondary "area study" program. And even 
after Berque has shown what logical depth structure can be salvaged from their 
own traditional thought, few of them may now be willing to admit that establishing 
a productive connection between Eastern and Western tradition is their proper 
philosophical task. They would certainly welcome the powerful voices uttered 
against the universality claim of Reason by Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger. But it is 
unlikely that they would on that ground cal into question the validity of what has 
been the backbone of Western philosophy for the past two millennia. 
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For them it is only proper to situate the problem of non-Aristotelian logic in a 
more global perspective. This means that even if they admit the significance of 
chiastic logic, they w叫 dnot regard it as primarily rooted in, or represented by, 
the Eastern culture as explored in recent climatological studies. Their usual way of 
locating it contextually would be to point their finger at the now familiar caption: 
"Primacy of Perception." Just as this Merlau-Pontyan topic can forgo in its bibliog-
raphical index any reference to climatology, so can a chapter on chiastic logic be 
written in a phenomenological journal or lexicon in Japan without reference to 
Watsuji or Berque at al且Inthe eyes of a Japanese specializing in Western philosophy, 
the "global" perspective is stil very much dominated by the topics that he selects 
from current researches of Western scholars, and this often ignores what Western 
scholars have done on Asian philosophy. The philosophical professionalism in Asian 
nations to this day stil thinks it honorable to leave the cultural divide between 
East and West intact. 
This is understandable if a Western scholar without knowledge of Asian lan-
guage and cultural background abstains as a rule from amateurish excursions into 
such alien territory. But what about ourselves? Aren't we so afraid of crossing the 
border that we, having crossed it once long ago, really don't want to risk it twice, 
even if that means choosing a return route to come home? After more than a century 
of selfless and self-forgotten immersion in the Western philosophy, has Asia ever 
produced an expert on Aristotle or Descartes, an expert who could supplement the 
Organon by a logic of chiasm, an expert who could upstage the Discourse on 
Method by formulating non-mechanistic and non-Egocentric rules and regulations of 
thinking? Ironically, this is not even a chauvinistic appeal, because the work of 
Western scholars like Berque has largely obviated such an appeal. In fact a 
respectable Asian counterpart of Berque is hardly needed, because, as has been 
mentioned above, radical critique and reversal of established theory always came 
from within the Western philosophy itself. 
Now in spite of this contribution to the logic of Fudo which has ingratiated itself 
to the Japanese mind, our studied assumption regarding Berque's own mind is that 
for him the reign of Logos is by no means diminished by his tour de force. Logos is 
a sovereign territory within which, as an enclave, the logic of chiasm may coexist. 
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The two logics are not mutually exclusive. The chiastic logic is an extension of the 
traditional logic by other means, such as the genetic, instead of the static, 
phenomenological description, or after the manner of an organic, instead of a 
mechanical model of cosmological explanation, etc. These other means are employed 
to supplement, not to supplant the existing logical system. Or perhaps it is fairer to 
say that even within the chiastic system, subject and object do not really disappear 
completely. While they may, in their incessant "itinerant" flux, refuse to be pinned 
down, they can be subordinated to the category of relation, which then functions as 
if it were the subject, but of a dialectical nature, by splitting itself into its opposite, 
the "object-pole," and mediating it with itself as the "subject-pole." Berque's concept 
"trajet''(tsutaz) addresses exactly this fluid, itinerant relationship between subject 
and object. It has already been pointed out how this movement bears resemblance 
to that of Hegel's Absolute Spirit. 
As it happens, with his sweeping claim that the traditional subject-centered 
paradigm of logic must be reversed, Merleau-Ponty stood during his lifetime much 
closer to another contemporary philosopher than the world had suspected. His 
appeal to reverse the traditional logic was, by no means coincidentally,14 inspired 
by the same concern that drove Heidegger to his critique of the Occidental logic. 
Both saw the need to let the object -the "things" rather than the subject or the 
representation (idea) of things -come alive and fully come to its own. The major 
difference was that Heidegger was more historically engaged and attempted his 
task of reversal simultaneously by evoking the ethos of heroic struggle15 of ancient 
Greeks to tame Being -also known as Physis. In the process, he became a modern 
fellow traveler of Merleau-Ponty and a prime co-witness of the logic of reversibility 
in which the subjectivity, the tamer, had to become the tamed in the end. 
In an article entitled "XIASMA: Merleau-Ponty und Heidegger王RudolfBoehm 
discussed the fascinating topic that Merleau-Ponty chose the word "chiasm" as a 
"key to understand and to take issue with Heidegger." Merleau-Ponty's final answer 
was summed up in the following quotation from his work Le visible et I'invisible 
(23): "Le monde perceptif'amorphe'... , ce monde perceptif est au fond l'Etre au 
sens de Heidegger .... " This is a bold statement that can raise many eyebrows. If 
there is a discussion of the "life-worldly" mode of experience by Heidegger that 
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comes anywhere near Merleau-Ponty's sense of "perception", that may be the 
description of the "state of mind" (Stimmung) in Being and Time. But even here, 
the seemingly mundane "care" in its average everydayness is fraught with speculative 
import peculiar to Heidegger's quest of Being which, as "transcendens pure and 
simple," can hardly be brought down to the level of Merleau-Ponty's perceptual 
world. In a purely schematic sense, though, when "chiasm" is used as the keyword, 
there is an undeniable affinity between those two thinkers. Consider Heidegger's 
frequent reversal of the genitival (possessive) relationship, such as between Dasein 
and Sein, Thought and Being, man and language, man and technology, etc. It is 
difficult to decide who is a more chiastically engaged philosopher between him and 
Merleau-Ponty. 
But the most significant lesson that comes out of Boehm's study is that, of the 
two relata, Thought and Being, for example, one that is founded (Thought) can 
never exhaust in its exchange relationship the meaning of that which "founds" it 
(Being). This may seem to suggest that, when translated into the relationship 
between culture and nature, nature asserts itself eventually as the "absolute subject", 
the consequence of which will be the disintegration of the chiastic balance. 
However, as long as the "founding" nature (as the subject) must depend on the 
"founded" culture for its own communication, the asserted primacy is negated 
(aufgehoben). Hegel's "Master and Slave Logic" comes instantly to our mind. Thus 
the ambiguity, or the "equivocation" of the exchange relationship simply persists as 
the very essence of Xiasma -it is not to be surpassed. 
All this reminder of the self-criticism of Logos as part of the internal development 
of the Western philosophy brings us back to the simple question of logical status of 
the subject, as it was raised earlier by Watsuji. and after him more explicitly 
by Berque. But it is a high-stake issue concerning whether philosophy in our new 
century can evolve beyond the traditional cultural divide of East and West. At this 
divide, the status of Logos is now called into question from both sides, and the 
concept of chiastic logic stands as the focal point of attention. W atsuji and Berque 
are important participants in a trial case of this underlying logic of climatology as a 
human science. Berque is a Western scholar who worked himself into the heart of 
Japanese culture. As a net result, he has brought a heightened awareness to the 
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self-understanding of the Japanese, but the limit dictated by the low threshold of 
awareness of the Japanese with regard to the larger horizon of Asian culture had 
to remain Berque's limit also. 
In a sense it was a good fortune that Berque could set himself to a well defined 
task of using the island nation of Japan as a model for his climatological studies. 
Her geographical isolation from the Asian continent, the concentration of her ethnically 
homogeneous population in a relatively confined space and the autochthonous 
development of Sino-Japanese culture over a lengthy period of time, al guaranteed 
an ideal description of Japan's culture in a nearly one to one correlation with 
climatological factors. By contrast, it would be extremely dificult to chisel an ethnically 
distinct profile of Benelux, French or German culture out of the largely identical 
climatological conditions of Western Europe. Therefore, Berque only very rarely 
strayed into an adjacent territory such as China which, even though lumped 
together with Japan and even India to the same monsoon climate by Watsuji, 
displayed vastly different physical characteristics and corresponding ethnographic 
features. 
At this point, we cannot help imagining ourselves asking Monsieur Berque the 
geographer whether he could have engaged himself with as much gusto in a milieu 
so vast and seemingly devoid of "content" as the Chinese. The descriptions "vacuous 
vastness" and "absence of contents" were in fact the two recurring attributes Watsuji 
applied to China in his work. (蹄do,202 f.) On the other hand, Watsuji prided himself 
on the Japanese attribute of delicacy and refinement. (kime-no komakasa, ibid. 214 
f.) Although this commonly recognized attention to finer details in thought and 
work retains its validity as a major positive feature of the Japanese style of life, it 
is an oversimplification to put the Chinese mind on the opposite end of the scale for 
being "vacuous" and "lacking in content." For one could make a positive use of this 
same negative attribute and turn it against Watsuji and say that his own descriptive 
technique applied on China was rather lacking in imagination and empathy. For 
one thing, wasn't W atsuji himself ful of praise for the Chinese capability to be as 
fine and as particular about details as the Japanese, if not more so, and cited examples 
of jewel boxes, scroll paintings and sculptures during Han and Tang dynasty? (ibid. 
214 f.) And yet his description of Chinese character and temperament was so 
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thoroughly negative as to make us suspect that he was overwhelmingly under the 
influence of the physical landscape of China, neglecting to see behind it the illustrious 
cultural accomplishments in religion, philosophy, art, poetry and folklores. After al, 
climatology is not about the raw nature, but about milieu, in which nature must 
emerge as blended with culture. 
The "vacuity" and "emptiness of content" were quite consciously seized upon as 
the medium of equalizer for the lacking details in Chinese art and literature. The 
Taoist masters, according to Wing-Tsit Chan, "knew how to use the empty space 
as a constructive element in the Chinese landscape painting ..... Similarly, much 
was left unsaid in Chinese poetry, so as to enable the reader to play a creative role 
in bringing the poetic movement of thought to fruition."17 Watsuji stood, bleak at 
heart and dizzy-eyed, along the vast and "empty" Yangtse River and forgot to recite 
even a single Chinese poem to enliven the land-and riverscape of this neighboring 
country to whose brilliant civilization he said he owed so much in the past. Didn't 
Berque himself evoke, on the other hand, a formidable battery of medieval and 
modern Japanese poesy to make a drop of rain, a flake of cherry petal, a pale crescent 
moon, teem with emotions and assume almost a human face? After al, what subtleties 
of observation and astuteness of conceptual analysis were concerned, didn't Berque 
outdo the Japanese on their own ground, in their own climate? 
This is the reason why we were, though only in our passing fancy, tempted to 
enlist the competence of Berque's caliber in drawing wider regions of Asia into 
climatologicai comparatistics. For certain linguistic and logical characteristics such 
as the absence or abatement of the subject, and substitution of the "ambient" 
causality for the "linear" causality, a non-linear temporality etc., are common to 
Asian culture as a whole. Nevertheless, more of the symmetrical and correlational 
structure and hence more of the℃ artesian" sense of rationality dominated also in 
Chinese way of thinking, in their cosmology and philosophy of nature, than was the 
case with the Japanese thought. Speaking of the logic of chiasm, such a reversal 
through cultural penetration into what appears to be a mere given physical datum 
has been a discernible pattern in much of the Taoist literature as well. Thus a cli-
matological handbook on China has yet to be written, if we are to fully take into 
account, for example, the theory of "Feng-shi" (wind and water) which is unique to 
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China and Korea. 
In spite of so many negative things W atsuji had to say about China due to his 
short-circuit, deterministic inferences, he was stil a tal Asian thinker who devoted 
to China a serious chapter of no less than twenty four pages (F釦do,199-222) under 
the title: "Special Form of Monsoon Type Climate." He also showed a genuine concern 
about the sadly declining fate of China during his time. Recalling that from this 
proud Middle Kingdom Japan inherted a splendid civilization which Japan "adored 
and strove to assimilate without reservation for over a thousand years until the 
Meiji Restoration," W atsuji concluded his chapter with a passionate appeal: ℃ hina 
must be revived. She must restore the grandeur of her culture like the one during 
the Han and Tang Dynasty. For the sake of world's new cultural progress, China's 
renaissance is indispensable." (ibid. 222) Then he lashed out at the corrupt Chinese 
military cliques as "the enemy of the Chinese people" for stubbornly holding on to 
a policy that threatened to turn China into an utter colony of foreign powers. 
This was 1929, when Watsuji was forty years old. We know al too well what has 
happened to China since then. But how many of today's philosophers living in 
Japan share the similar heart-felt concern of W atssuji's even though under quite 
different circumstances? Should not we Asians wish that China return with al her 
old cultural glory as a modem nation? W atsuji was perhaps brutally honest when 
he urged the Chinese to take the lesson from Japan, even as Japan assimilated 
Chinese culture and "improved it considerably by refining it." What he al too 
obviously implied was that Japan, after having learned from China al that can be 
learned, had to look past China, past Asia, in order to play her bigger role in a 
global setting. Therefore China must take care of herself. But Watsuji was 
mistaken if he believed that the task of restoration of such a magnitude could be 
left in the hands of the Chinese people alone. China is the fountainhead of the entire 
Asian civilization, and its stil unexhausted value is symbolically demonstrated by 
the successive waves of recent archeological excavations which revealed surprising 
details and many unsolved anthropological and archaeological questions. (e.g. Qin 
Shi Huang Di's tomb in Xian) 
If al the sciences and arts of ancient Greece were not fostered and kept up con-
tinuously by so many nations of Europe throughout the ages, we would not have 
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become beneficiaries of human achievements that transcend national boundaries. 
To regard China just as another nation to be left to her own makeshift is an atti-
tude unbefitting a member of the community of nations in Asia who owe so much 
to that great nation. But it is not just a matter of repaying the past debt. It has to 
do with preserving and upgrading the living spirit of humanity of which we par-
take. There is much yet to be repaired, much to be researched, and stil much 
more to be refin『edabout old China's legacy. Watsuji's motto of cultural refinement 
was executed in a cross-culturally updated form through the work of Augustin 
Berque -nota bene with Japan as the study case, as if she needed more subtle re-
finement! Nothing less than such a total loving devotion across the borders should 
be our guiding spirit for today's East-West cultural researches. 
1 A. Biese. Entwicklung des Naturg碩ihlsbei den Griechen und Romern. 2 Bde. Lipsius & 
Tischner 1882/84; derseibe, Entwick!ung des Naturgefahls im Mittelalter und der Ncuzeit. 
Veit 1888. 
2 Kant, "Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit von Joh. Gottfr. Herder," in 
Kant's Schriften (Akademieausgabe) Bd. 8. S. 45. Watsuji himself quoted this remark of Kant 
in his work, Fuda, Tokyo 1935, p. 473 f. 
3 Watsuji Tetsuro, Fuda, Ningengakuteki Kosatsu, Tokyo 1935. 
4 Compare Augustin Berque's following remark on this point (fre translation): "As has been 
said often, it is evident that the Japanese refuse to unequivocally or decisively judge and 
condemn others. They have a high degree of sensibility for human frailty." Interestingly 
though, Berque adds the qualifying note:'But this generosity applies only within a certain 
publicly admissible context." A Berque. Kukan-no Nihon Bunka (Japanese translation of 
Vivre l'espace au Japan), Tokyo 1994, p. 271 . 
5 "Trajet''and "trajectivite" are rendered as "tsutai'and "tsutaisei" in Japanese. For a detailed 
analysis of these concepts see Augustn Berque, Fudo-no Nihon (abbrev. FnN), Tokyo 1992, 
pp. 181-191. 
6 Hegel compares the movement of Spirit to the "Bacchanalian revel .... which is just as 
much transparent and simple repose." Phenomenology of Spirilt, transl. by AV. Miller, 
Oxford 1977, pp. 27 f. 
7 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, 2nd Revised Edition, New York 1997, XXXXIV. 
8 A Biese, The Development of the Feeling of Nature in the Middle Ages and Modern Times, 
New York 1905, p. 28 f. Biese quotes here (24) a passage from Vischer's Aestheガkthat "German 
feeling was early influenced by the different forms of plant life around it. Rigid pine, delicate 
birch, stalwart oak, each had its efect. etc. " Itshould be noted, however, that those plants 
could exercise such an influence only because they were described and sung in poetry, and 
thus conditioned the folk soul to be receptive to such linguistically mediated plant qualities. 
21 
Biese states this uumistakably in his Preface (V): "I hold that literature, especially poetry, as 
the most intimate medium of a nation's feelings, is the chief source of information in an inquiry 
which may form a contribution, not only to the history of taste, but also to the comparative 
history of literature." 
9 For Cho's critique on this view of Husserl, Cf. Bewusstsein und Natursein, Freiburg 1987, p. 
251. 
10 Kukan-no Nihonbunka, transl. of Augustin Berque, Vivre l'espace au Japan by Miyahara 
Makoto, Tokyo 1994, p. 48 f. (quoted as KnN) 
1 Karel van Wolferen, Nihon Kenryoku Koza-no Nazo (The Enigma of Japanese Power, Japanese 
translation) Tokyo 1994 
12 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and invisible, English trans. by A. Lingis, Evanston 1968, 
193. Italics mine. 
13 See for example the entry "chiasme" in Genshogaku Jiten, Tokyo (Kobundo) 1994, pp. 81, 251. 
Cf. also the entry on "A. Berque," p. 403. 
14 Both Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger were drawn to painting, e.g. to Cezanne. 
15 Our own age is marked by the ubiquity of artificialy constructed reality which bears the 
stamp of being arranged according to man's "subjective perception." Heidegger named such 
an artificialy structured reality "World Picture." In a lecture dating back to 1938, but was 
published in 1950 under the title "The Age of World Picture" (Die Zeit des Weltbildes), 
Heidegger reminds us that a very different relationship to reality was the order of the day 
for the Greeks during the early stages of their world experience. Of this Greek view, he 
gave the following, at first somewhat puzzling description: "An entity does not become an 
entity just because man looks at it in the sense of representation (Vorstellen), as a kind of 
subjective perception. Rather, man is himself being looked at by the entity; he is called upon 
by the self-disclosing entity so as to tarry with, and respond to, the entity." (Free translation 
from the original): "Das Seiende wird nicht seiend dadurch, dass erst der Mensch es anschaut 
im Sinne gar des Vorstellens von der Art der subjektiven Perception. Vielmehr ist der 
Mensch der vom Seienden Angeschaute, von dem Sichoffnenden auf das Anwesen bei ihm 
Versammelte." Holzwege, Frankfurt 1950, S. 83. What is conjured here is not an anthropomorphic 
fable in which things of nature take on human faces and are looking at man. If it sounds like 
a fairy tale, then it is so only to the extent that man must have recourse to a poetic language 
in order to respond to the truth of entity which discloses itself "contradictorily." With this 
visual metaphor Heidegger was in fact hinting at the many contradicting faces of physz's, 
whose rivaling modes of self-manifestation are far too unbridled for man's domesticated eyes 
to be registered in but one central perspective. A variation of the same visual metaphor is 
used in a fundamental way also by Merleau-Ponty in his essay L'oez'l et l'esprz't (1960), where 
he echoes Cezanne's paradigm that the painter's eye is not just over against things facing 
them, but is rather right in the things. Christoph Jamme addresses this highly provocative 
thesis which is brought home to us mainly by phenomenology -he named both Merleau-
Ponty and Heidegger -by the thesis that philosophy with its ingrained representational 
thinking has reached the very limits of what it can say, and hence a "partnership of art," 
specifically of painting, is called for in its further search for truth. 
22 
Phenomenology finds a new ground opening up before itself -a brute nature prior to domes-
tication. Cf. Christopf Jamme, "Malerei der Blindheit", Phanomenologische Phz'losophz'e und 
Malerei, in Gunther Poltner (Hrsg.), Phtinomenologie der Kunst, Wiener Tagungen zur 
Phtinomenologie 1999, Frankfurt a. M., 1999, S. 109 f. 
Heidegger's expression that an entity is looking at us, means thus "picture" is reverted to a 
living reality. World is no longer reduced to a static picture to be merely looked at, but it is 
restored to the fullness of its life, -such is none other than Husserl's Life-World. For 
Merleau-Ponty, this world is one accessible not through thinking, but through perception. 
The other word used by Heidegger, "contradiction," implies, to extrapolate Heidegger's sense 
of two-way "correspondence" between "Thought" and "Being" discussed in Letter on Humanism, 
actually the overwhelming primacy of Being over Thought. For it is Being that compels 
(man's) Thought to think of Being. Even his forgetfulness to think of Being is not a fortuitous 
accident, but an event meted out to him by Being. And while man thinks of Being, he is tossed 
around mercilessly by the brute force of Being. 
16 Durchblicke: Martin Heidegger zum 80. Geburtstag, Frankfurt 1970, p. 369 f. 
17 Wing-Tsit Chan, The Way of Lao Tzu, New York 1963, p. 119 f. 
23 
